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Abstract
The connection between games and no-regret algorithms has been widely studied in the literature. A
fundamental result is that when all players play no-regret strategies, this produces a sequence of actions
whose time-average is a coarse-correlated equilibrium of the game. However, much less is known about
equilibrium selection in the case that multiple equilibria exist.
In this work, we study the convergence of no-regret bidding algorithms in auctions. Besides being of
theoretical interest, bidding dynamics in auctions is an important question from a practical viewpoint as
well. We study repeated game between bidders in which a single item is sold at each time step and the
bidder’s value is drawn from an unknown distribution. We show that if the bidders use any mean-based
learning rule then the bidders converge with high probability to the truthful pure Nash Equilibrium in a
second price auction, in VCG auction in the multi-slot setting and to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a
first price auction. We note mean-based algorithms cover a wide variety of known no-regret algorithms
such as Exp3, UCB, -Greedy etc. Also, we analyze the convergence of the individual iterates produced by
such learning algorithms, as opposed to the time-average of the sequence. Our experiments corroborate
our theoretical findings and also find a similar convergence when we use other strategies such as Deep
Q-Learning.
1 Introduction
The connection between Learning and Games has proven to be a very innovative, practical, and elegant area
of research (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998); Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Nisan et al. (2007)).
Several fundamental connections have been made between Learning and Game Theory. A folklore result is
that if all players play low-regret strategies in a repeated general-sum game, then the time-averaged history
of the plays converges to a coarse correlated equilibrium (see, e.g., Blum and Monsour (2007)). Similarly,
low-swap-regret play leads to correlated equilibria.
In this work, we are interested in the setting of multi-agent learning in auction environments. Given the
importance of auctions and bidding in the online advertising ecosystem, this is an important question from a
practical point of view as well. In this setting, an auction takes input bids and determines the allocation of
ad-slots and the prices for each advertiser. This is a highly repeated auction setting over a huge number of
queries which arrive over time. Advertisers get feedback on the allocation and cost achieved by their chosen
bidding strategy, and can respond by changing their bids, and often do so in an automated manner (we
will assume throughout that advertisers are profit-maximizing, although there are potentially other goals as
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well). As each advertiser responds to the feedback, it changes the cost landscape for every other competing
advertiser via the auction rules. As advertisers respond to the auction and to each other, the dynamics lead
them to an equilibrium. This results in the following fundamental question: Given a fixed auction rule, do
such bidding dynamics settle in an equilibrium and if so, what equilibrium do they choose.
Surprisingly, neither the Auction Theory literature from Economics nor the literature on Learning in
Games provides a definitive answer. Consider the simplest setting: a repeated auction for a single item, where
the allocation is either first-price or second-price. Auction Theory suggests that bidders converge to canonical
equilibria (see, e.g., Krishna (2002)):
• For a second-price auction (or more generally a VCG auction), bidders will choose to be truthful (bid their
true value every time) as this strategy weakly dominates every other strategy, i.e., no other strategy can
yield more profit. This is a weakly dominating strategy Nash equilibirum (NE).
• For a first price auction in which each advertiser’s value is picked from some commonly known distribution
in an i.i.d. manner, each advertiser will underbid in a specific way to achieve a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
(BNE). For example, when there are two bidders and the value distribution is the uniform distribution on
[0, 1], then each advertiser will set its bid to be half of its true value.
While these canonical equilibria make intuitive sense, they are not the only equilibria in the respective
games. For example, consider a single-item setting in which bidder 1 has a value of 1.0 and bidder 2 has a
value of 0.5 for the item. While truthful bidding is an NE, any two values b1, b2 ∈ [0.5, 1.0]2, with b1 > b2
also form an NE (in fact, an Envy-Free NE). Thus, there are an infinite number of NEs, with very different
revenues. Similarly, in the Bayesian setting where the values are drawn from say, a uniform distribution, there
are many NEs as well. For example, one player could bid 1 and the other player always bids 0 regardless of
their valuations. This issue of multiple equilibria is treated in the Economics literature via various notions of
equilibrium selection but it is not clear if such selection occurs naturally in settings such as ours, especially
via bidding dynamics.
To take the Learning in Games approach to answering the question, we have to fix the bidding dynamics.
We assume bidders use no-regret (mean-based) online learning algorithms; these are natural and powerful
strategies that we may expect advertisers to use. A lot of commonly used no-regret learning algorithms, e.g.
multiplicative weights update (MWU), follow the perturbed leader (FTPL), EXP3, UCB, and ε-Greedy, are
all special cases of mean-based no-regret learning algorithms.
Indeed, there has been considerable work recently which studies various questions in the online advertising
setting under this assumption (see, e.g., Nekipelov et al. (2015)). Folklore results in Learning imply that under
low-regret dynamics the time-average of the advertisers’ bids will converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium
(CCE) of the underlying game. However, there could be many CCEs in a game as well. Since every NE is a
CCE as well, the above examples hold for the second-price auction. For the first price setting (even when
the values are drawn uniformly at random) another CCE is for the two bidders to bid (v1 + v2)/2 +  and
(v1 + v2)/2 where v1 and v2 are the drawn values, and v1 > v2. Further, since any convex combination of
these CCEs is a valid CCE (the set of CCE forms a polytope), there is an infinite number of CCEs in both
first and second price auctions. So again we are left with the prediction dilemma: it is not clear which of these
CCEs a low-regret algorithm will converge to. Some of the CCEs are clearly not good for the ecosystem, for
revenue or efficiency. Further, as we elaborate below, even if there is a unique CCE in the games of interest,
the convergence guarantee is only for the time-average rather than point-wise.
Questions
These examples directly motivate the questions we ask in this paper:
• If the values are drawn in a bayesian setting, and the bidders follow a low-regret learning algorithm in a
repeated second-price auction, do they converge to the truthful equilibrium?
• Similarly, in a first price auction with i.i.d. values with bidders values drawn from a uniform distribution
[0, 1], do they converge to the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (with two bidders) of bidding half of true value?
2
• Do the bidding dynamics converge to such an equilibrium point-wise, i.e., in the last-iterate sense, or only
in the time-average sense?
• When there are multiple slots, do the bidders converge to truthful equilibrium under VCG settings?
Given the current state of the literature, we see these as fundamental questions to ask. The only guarantees
we have are those known for general games: Low-regret dynamics converge to some CCE and there is no
guarantee for the last-iterate convergence. If it is the case that only the time average converges, then that
means that bidders may be required to keep changing their bidding strategy at every time step (see the
discussion on the non-point-wise-convergence results in Bailey and Piliouras (2018) below), and would achieve
very different rewards over time. This would not be a satisfactory situation in the practical setting.
Our Results
Our main result is that when each of the bidders use a mean-based learning rule (see Definition 2.2) then all
bidders converge to truthful bidding in a second-price auction and a multi-position VCG auction and to the
Bayes Nash Equilibrium in a first-price auction.
Informal Main Theorem. Suppose n players whose value are drawn from a distribution over space
{ 1H , 2H , . . . , 1} bid according to a mean-based learning algorithm in either (i) a second-price auction; (ii) a
first-price auction (for n = 2 and uniform value distribution); or (iii) a multi-position VCG auction. Then,
after an initial exploration phase, each bidder bids the canonical Bayes Nash equilibrium with high probability.
The formal statement of this theorem appears in Theorem 3.1, Theorem 4.1, and Theorem 4.3 for
second-price auctions, first-price auctions, and multi-position VCG auctions, respectively. Moreover, we show
each bidder converges to bid canonical Nash Equilibrium point-wise for any time, which is in sharp contrast
with previous time-average convergence analysis.
Throughout this paper, we assume the learning algorithms that the bidders use may be oblivious to the
auction format that is used by the seller.
We complement these results by simulating the above model with experiments. In particular, we show
that these algorithms converge and produce truthful (or the canonical) equilibria. Furthermore, we show
that the algorithm converges much quicker than the theory would predict. These results indicate that these
low-regret algorithms are quite robust in the context of Auctions.
1.1 Our Techniques
Our proof techniques involve a few key observations. For second-price and VCG auctions, we want to show
that the bidding converges to truthful bidding. Firstly, note that if the other bidders bid completely randomly
then the truthful arms have a slight advantage in profit. However, the other bidders themselves bid according
to their own instance of the low-regret algorithms, thus the environment that a given bidder sees is not
necessarily random; hence we need more insight. Fix a particular bidder, say bidder 1. In the beginning of the
learning algorithm, all bidders do bid randomly. The next observation is that if the other bidders happened to
converge to truthful bidding, then again bidder 1 will see completely random bids, because the other bidders’
values are picked randomly at each stage. Hence we can say that both in the beginning and also if other
bidders happen to converge to (or for some reason were restricted to) truthful bidding, then bidder 2 will see
an advantage in truthful bidding and converge to that. It remains to show that in the interim period, when
all bidders are learning, exploring, and exploiting, the truthful strategy builds and retains an advantage.
In a first price auction, the proofs follow the same structure. However there are some technical difficulties
that one must overcome. Initially, both bidders bid uniformly at random and it is not difficult to show
that bidding according to the canonical NE gives an advantage. If the bidders happen to converge to the
BNE then, of course, bidding according to the BNE is the optimal strategy for either player. It is not clear,
however, that when the opposing bid is not uniform or bidding according to the BNE that an advantage is
maintained. Our technical contribution here is to show that an advantage for bidding the BNE is maintained
which allows both bidders to converge to the BNE.
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Our results show that we can achieve high probability results we can show that the model will bid truthfully
for all time (assuming a modest exploratory period in the begining). This requires a new partitioning argument
which enables us to apply concentrations results for all times. This technique may be of independent interest.
1.2 Related Works
Our work lies in a wide area of the inter-disciplinary research between mechanism design and online learning
algorithms, e.g., Auer et al. (1995); Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006); Blum and Monsour (2007), and we only
point out a few lines of research which are more closely related to our work.
In online advertising, the setting where bidders may be running no-regret algorithms rather than best
response, has recently been investigated and has garnered a significant amount of interest. For example,
Nekipelov et al. (2015) study how to infer advertisers’ values under this assumption. However, Bailey and
Piliouras (2018) show, somewhat surprisingly, that even in very simple games (e.g., a zero-sum matching
pennies game), the no-regret dynamics of MWU do not converge, and in fact the individual iterates tend to
diverge from the CCE. On the other hand, recent results in Daskalakis and Panageas (2018); Mertikopoulos
et al. (2019) show that certain Optimistic variants of Gradient Descent and Mirror Descent converge in the
last-iterate to the NE in certain zero-sum games. Our result can be seen as a contribution in this stream
of work as well, in that we show that for the (non-zero sum) games arising from auctions that we study,
mean-based learning algorithms converge in the last iterate, and, in fact, to the natural (Bayes) NE. On a
related note, Papadimitriou and Piliouras (2019) shows there is a conflict between the economic solution
concepts and those predicted by Learning Dynamics. In that framework, one can consider this work as
suggesting that perhaps there is no such conflict between economic theory and learning, in the context of
games arising from auctions, as learning converges to the solutions predicted by auction theory.
Our work is also related with Learning to bid literature, e.g., Weed et al. (2016); Feng et al. (2018);
Balseiro et al. (2019), where these papers focus on designing a good learning algorithm for the bidders in
repeated auctions. In addition, Braverman et al. (2018) considers how to design a mechanism to maximize
revenue against bidders who adopt mean-based learning algorithms. In contrast, the auctions are fixed in our
setting and we are interested in understanding the bidder dynamics.
Last but not least, Feldman et al. (2016) characterize multiple equilibria (NE, CE, and CCE) in first price
auctions, under the prior-free (non-Bayesian) setting, and study the revenue and efficiency properties of these
equilibria. They show there are auctions in which a CCE can have as low as 1 − 2/e ' 0.26 factor of the
second highest value (although not lower), and there are auctions in which a CCE can have as low as 0.81 of
the optimal efficiency (but not lower). However, our results show that even though there may be “Bad” CCEs,
the natural dynamics do not reach them, and instead, converge to the classic canonical Nash equilibrium.
2 Model and Notations
We consider the setting that there is a single seller repeatedly selling one good to n bidders per round. At each
time t, each bidder i’s valuation vi,t is i.i.d. drawn from an unknown (CDF) distribution Fi and bidder i will
submit a bid bi,t based on vi,t and historical information. In this paper, we assume the value and the bid of
each bidder at any time are always in a 1H -evenly-discretized space V = { 1H , 2H , · · · , 1}, i.e, vi,t, bi,t ∈ V,∀i, t.
Let vt = (v1,t, · · · , vn,t) be the valuation profile of n bidders at time t, v−i,t be the valuation profile of bidders
other than i, and similarly for bt and b−i,t. Let F be the (CDF) distribution of vt and fi be the probability
density function (PDF) of bidder i’s value. Denote mi,t = maxj 6=i bj,t as the maximum bid of the bidders
other than i and zi,t = maxj 6=i vj,t be the maximum value of the bidders other than i. We denote Gi as the
(CDF) distribution of zi,t and gi as the associated PDF. For theoretical purpose, we propose an assumption
about Gi in the following,
Assumption 2.1 (Thickness Assumption of Gi). There exists a constant τ > 0 (may depend on n), s.t.,
gi(v) ≥ τ,∀i ∈ [n], v ∈ V . Without loss of generality1, we assume τ ≤ 1Hn−1 .
1It is without loss of generality, since if τ > 1
Hn−1 , we redefine τ := min
{
τ, 1
Hn−1
}
.
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We assume the each bidder runs a no-regret learning algorithm to decide her bid at each time. Specifically,
in this paper, we are interested in a broad class of no-regret learning algorithm known as mean-based
(contextual) learning algorithm Braverman et al. (2018); these include the multiplicative weights update
(MWU), Exp3, and ε-Greedy algorithms as special cases.
In this paper, we focus on the contextual version of mean-based learning algorithms, which can be used to
model learning algorithms of the bidders in repeated auctions, defined in the following.
Definition 2.2 (Mean-based Contextual Learning Algorithm). Let ra,t(c) be the reward of action a at
time t when the context is c and σa,t(c) =
∑t
s=1 ra,s(c). An algorithm for the contextual bandits problem
is γt-mean-based if it is the case that whenever σa,t(c) < σb,t(c) − γtt, then the probability pa,t(c) that the
algorithm plays action a on round t+ 1, given context c, is at most γt. We say an algorithm is mean-based if
it is γt-mean-based for some γt such that γtt is increasing and γt → 0 as t→∞. 2
In the repeated auctions setting, the context information received by each bidder i at time t is the
realization of the valuation vi,t. The reward function rib,t for bidder i can be defined as
∀v ∈ [0, 1], rib,t(v) := ui,t((b, b−i,t); v), (1)
where ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) is the utility of bidder i at time t when the bidder i bids b and the others bid b−i,t, if
bidder i values the good v.
2.1 Learning Algorithms of Mean-Based Bidders
In this paper, we focus on the setting where each bidder i runs a γt-means-based contextual learning algorithm
to submit the bid3. In addition, we assume each bidder runs several pure exploration steps in the beginning
to estimate the reward of each action (bid) for each context (value). We assume each bidder runs T0 pure
exploration steps: at each pure exploration step, each bidder i uniformly generates a bid from B at random,
regardless of the realization of value vi,t. To summarize, we describe the learning algorithm of mean-based
bidders in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Mean-based (Contextual) Learning Algorithm of Bidder i
1: procedure MBL(γt, T0)
2: for t = 1, 2, . . . , T0 do
3: Choose bid bi,t uniformly from V at random.
4: end for
5: for t = T0 + 1, T0 + 2, . . . do
6: Observes value vt.
7: Choose bid bi,t following a γt-mean-based learning algorithm.
8: end for
9: end procedure
In the learning to bid literature, there are different feedback models: full information feedback Pa-
padimitriou and Piliouras (2019), bandit feedback Weed et al. (2016); Feng et al. (2018), or cross-learning
feedback Balseiro et al. (2019). However, our results hold for any feedback model, as long as each bidder uses
the general mean-based learning algorithm to bid, shown in Algorithm 1.
2The mean-based learning algorithms proposed by Braverman et al. (2018) set γt be a constant, which only depends on total
number of time steps T . Here we extend it to be a time-dependent variable, which is used to show our anytime convergence
results.
3Indeed, our analysis can be extended to the setting where each mean-based bidder has different γt parameters. We assume
they share parameters γt, for notation simplicity.
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3 Second Price Auctions with Mean-based Bidders
In this section, we analyze the learning dynamics of mean-based bidders in (repeated) second price auctions.
In second price auctions, the utility function of each bidder i at time t can be represented as,
ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) = (v −mi,t) · I{b ≥ mi,t} (2)
Since the bids of each bidder are in a discrete space, we break ties randomly throughout this paper. We
first show the following main theorem in this section, which proves that the mean-based learners converge to
truthful reporting point-wisely, in the repeated second price auctions.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose assumption 2.1 holds and T0 is large enough, such that exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
≤ 12 and
γt ≤ τ8nH ,∀t ≥ T0. Then at time t > T0, each γt-mean-based learner i will submit bt = vi,t in repeated
second price auctions with probability at least p(t) = 1 −Hγt − 4 exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
, for any fixed vi,t. Note
p(t)→ 1− 4 exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
when t→∞.
Our main results for second price auctions show an anytime convergence for each bidder: as long as T0
is large enough, each bidder will bid truthfully at any time t, with high probability. The main technical
contribution in this paper is the proof for Theorem 3.1.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
In this section, we summarize the proof of Theorem 3.1. To show that, we propose the following lemmas, in
which the complete proofs are deferred to Appendix B.
Firstly, we characterize that in the pure exploration phase, each bidder gains significantly greater utility
when bidding truthfully.
Lemma 3.2. For any fixed value v, any bid b 6= v and any time t ≤ T0, we have for each bidder i,
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
)
≥ τ
n
Then by a standard Chernoff bound, we can argue the accumulative utility advantage obtained by bidding
truthfully will be large enough, for any time t in exploration phase.
Lemma 3.3. For any fixed v, any bid b 6= v and any time t ≤ T0, we have for each bidder i,∑
s≤t
ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ τt
2nH
holds with probability at least 1− exp
(
− τ2t2n2H2
)
.
Finally, we show that if the cumulative utility advantage of truthful bidding is large enough to satisfy
requirements of the mean-based learning algorithms, then truthful bidding still gains significant greater utility
for each bidder at time t > T0.
Lemma 3.4. For any t > T0, suppose
∑
s≤t ui,s((v, b−i,s); v) − ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ γtt holds for any fixed
v, b 6= v and each bidder i, then
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ 1
H
holds with probability at least τ2n , for any fixed value v, bid b 6= v and each bidder i.
Given the above three auxiliary lemmas, we prove Theorem 3.1 in the following.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. One of the key techniques used in this paper is the partitioning of the time steps into
buckets with a geometric partitioning scheme. In particular, we divide time steps t > T0 to several episodes
as follows, Γ1 = [T0 + 1, T1],Γ2 = [T1 + 1, T2], ..., such that ∀k ≥ 1, Tk =
⌊
τTk−1
4γTknH
⌋
. We always choose the
smallest Tk to satisfy this condition.4 The total time steps of each episode |Γk| = Tk−Tk−1,∀k ≥ 1. Then we
show the following claim, which states that in each time bucket the expected utility doesn’t deviate too much.
Claim 3.5. Let event Ek be
∑
s≤Tk ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ τTk4nH holds for all i, given any fixed
v, b 6= v. Then the event Ek holds with probability at least 1−
∑k
`=0 exp
(
− |Γ`|τ232n2H2
)
.
We prove the above claim by induction. If k = 0, the claim holds by Lemma 3.3. We assume the claim
holds for k, then we argue the claim still holds for k + 1. We consider any time t ∈ Γk+1, given event Ek
holds, we have ∑
s≤t ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)
≥∑s≤Tk ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)
≥ τTk4nH ≥ γtt, (3)
where the first inequality is based on the fact that truth-telling is the dominant strategy in second price
auctions, the second inequality holds because of the induction assumption and the last inequality hold because
γtt ≤ γTk+1Tk+1 = γTk+1 ·
⌊
τTk
4γTk+1nH
⌋
≤ τTk
4nH
,∀t ∈ Γk+1.
Then by Lemma 3.4, given Ek holds, for any t ∈ Γk+1 we have,
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
∣∣∣Ek) ≥ τ
2n
Thus, E
[
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v)
∣∣∣Ek] ≥ τ2nH for any t ∈ Γk+1. By Azuma’s inequality (for
martingales), we have
P
 ∑
s∈Γk+1
ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ τ |Γk+1|
4nH
∣∣∣Ek

Letting ∆s = ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v),
≤ P
 ∑
s∈Γk+1
∆s ≤
∑
s∈Γk+1
E
[
∆s
∣∣∣Ek]− τ |Γk+1|
4nH
∣∣∣Ek

≤ exp
(
−|Γk+1|τ
2
32n2H2
)
Therefore, the event Ek+1 holds with probability at least(
1− e−
|Γk+1|τ2
32n2H2
)
· P(Ek) ≥ 1−
k+1∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|τ
2
32n2H2
)
,
which completes the induction and verifies the correctness of Claim 3.5. Given Claim 3.5, we have the
following argument,
4Tk always exists since γtt→∞ as t→∞.
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For any time t > T0, there exists k(t), s.t., t ∈ Γk(t), if the event Ek(t) happens, the bidder i will report
truthfully with probability at least 1−Hγt, by the definition of γt-mean-based learning algorithms and the
same argument as Eq. (5). Therefore, at any time t > T0, each bidder i will report truthfully with probability
at least
1−Hγt −
k(t)∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|τ
2
32n2H2
)
Then we bound
∑k(t)
`=0 exp
(
− |Γ`|τ232n2H2
)
through the following claim, where the proof is deferred to Ap-
pendix B.
Claim 3.6. Given γt ≤ τ8nH ,∀t > T0,
∑k(t)
`=0 exp
(
− |Γ`|τ232n2H2
)
≤ 4 exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
, when T0 is large enough
s.t. exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
≤ 12 .
Combining the above claim, we complete the proof for Theorem 3.1.
4 Generalizations to other auctions
In this section, we generalize our results further to first price auctions when each bidder’s valuation is drawn
uniformly from V , and multi-position auctions when we run the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism.
For both cases, we break ties randomly.
4.1 First Price Auctions
In first price auctions, the highest bidder wins and pays her bid. Therefore the utility function of each bidder
i at time t can be defined as,
ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) = (v − b) · I{b ≥ mi,t} (4)
It is well-known, first price auctions are not truthful and each bidder will underbid her value to manipulate
the auctions. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) bidding strategy is hard to characterize in general first
price auctions. Only the BNE bidding strategy for i.i.d bidders in first price auctions, is fully understood,
e.g. Krishna (2002).
In this paper, for simplicity, we focus on the setting that there are two i.i.d bidders with uniform value
distribution over V . The BNE bidding strategy for each bidder is b = v2 when the value is v Krishna (2002),
if the value space V = [0, 1]. In this work, we assume V =
{
1
H ,
2
H , · · · , 1
}
and we break ties randomly. Under
this case, we show each mean-based bidder will converge to play near-BNE bidding strategy point-wisely if
the number of initial exploration steps T0 is large enough in the following.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose there are two bidders and each bidder’s value is i.i.d drawn uniformly from V at
random, H is a even positive number, and T0 is large enough, such that γt ≤ 14H3 ,∀t ≥ T0. Then at time
t > T0, each γt-mean-based learner i in repeated first price auctions will bid bt, s.t. v2 ≤ bt < v2 + 1H with
probability at least 1−Hγt − exp
(
− (H−1)T032(4H3+1)H4
)
log t
log
(
4H3+H
4H3+1
) , for any fixed vi,t.
The proof is significantly different than the proof of second price auctions. Firstly, random tie-breaking
makes the analysis more difficult in first price auctions compared with the one in second price auctions.
Secondly, b = d v2e 5 is not a dominant bidding strategy, we need a more complex time-splitting scheme to
make induction procedure works in first price auctions. We defer the proof to Appendix B.5. We believe our
proof for firs price auctions is general enough and can be extended to handle more than two bidders setting.
5dxe means rounding x up to the nearest point in V .
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4.2 Multi-Position VCG Auctions
In multi-position auctions, there are k positions where k < n and position multipliers p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pk ≥ 0 =
pk+1 = · · · = pn (position multipliers determine the relative values or click-through rates of the different
positions). In particular, we will also say that pi − pi+1 ≥ ρ for all i ≤ k. In this paper, we run VCG
mechanism for multi-position auctions. For more details of multi-position VCG auctions, see Appendix A.
Denote z(k)i be the k-th largest value from the bidders other than bidder i, G
(k)
i be the (CDF) distribution
of z(k)i , and g
(k)
i be the associated PDF. We propose the following thickness assumption for distribution G
(k)
i ,
for our theoretical purpose.
Assumption 4.2 (Thickness Assumption of G(k)i ). There exists a constant τ > 0 (may depend on n), s.t.,
g
(k)
i (v) ≥ τ,∀i ∈ [n],∀v ∈ V . Without loss of generality, we assume τ ≤ 1Hn−1 .
It is well-known that the VCG auction is truthful. Applying the same technique, we can show the
truthful bid has an advantage compared with all the other bids in the exploration phase, as well as in the
mean-based exploitation phase. Similarly, we show the following convergence results of mean-based bidders
in multi-position VCG auctions.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose assumption 4.2 holds and T0 is large enough, such that exp
(
− τ2ρ2T032n2H2
)
≤ 12 and
γt ≤ τρ8nH ,∀t ≥ T0. Then at time t > T0, each γt-mean-based learner i will bt = vi,t in repeated multi-position
VCG auctions with probability at least 1−Hγt − 4 exp
(
− τ2ρ2T032n2H2
)
, for any fixed vi,t.
5 Experiments
In this section, we describe the experiments using Contextual Mean-Based Algorithms and Deep-Q Learning
agents participating in repeated first price and second price auctions. In these repeated auctions, the private
valuations of both players are sampled independently from identical uniform distributions. The observation
for each agent is defined by its private valuation and its reward by the auction outcome (with ties broken
randomly).
In the first set of experiments, we study the convergence of two independent learning agents following an
ε-Greedy policy in first and second price auction. We use the setting of H = 10 wherein both agents only
observe their private valuation and the respective reward as an auction outcome.
In both cases, we observe the bidders converge to the BNE after several time steps. There is a slight
gap between the (observed) mean reward and utility under BNE as the value of ε (randomly exploration
probability) has a floor of 0.05. We also observe that in the exploitation phase, the bidding converges
completely to the BNE in the contextual bandit setting, which exactly matches our theory in Figures 1a
and 2a. We also include some experiments when the number of agents is larger than 2 in Appendix C and we
find that the it still converges to BNE.
5.1 Extensions to Deep-Q Learning
Contextual Mean Based Algorithms are a broad class of algorithms but can be very expensive to implement
if we run a new instance for each possible value and the number of values are large. In line with modern
machine learning, one way to mitigate this in practice is to augment it via Deep Q-Learning. To be more
concrete, we model the learner by using a deep network with input as the private value and ask it to choose
one of many bids. We model this as a reinforcement learning problem where the agents state is input into a
deep neural network. The agent’s rewards are then observed over time with a chosen discount rate. The
details of Deep Q-Learning model and the set of hyperparameters used to train the two Q models are outlined
in Appendix C.
We use the setting of H = 100 and consider the observation of the agent as its private valuation. Again,
we observe that both agents converge to BNE, shown in Figures 1b and 2b. We also study the model with a
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(a) Training curve of mean reward of each bidder (left)
and roll-out bidding strategy of each bidder (right) in the
exploitation phase of contextual ε-Greedy algorithm in
second price auctions.
(b) Training curve of mean reward of each bidder (left)
and roll-out bidding strategy of each bidder (right) in the
exploitation phase of Deep-Q Learning algorithm in second
price auctions.
Figure 1: Simulation results for second price auctions
(a) Training curve of mean reward of each bidder (left)
and roll-out bidding strategy of each bidder (right) in the
exploitation phase of contextual ε-Greedy algorithm in
first price auctions.
(b) Training curve of mean reward of each bidder (left)
and roll-out bidding strategy of each bidder (right) in the
exploitation phase of Deep-Q Learning algorithm in first
price auctions.
Figure 2: Simulation Results for first price auctions
wider set of states including previously chosen bids and empirically observe the convergence of independent
DQN agents to BNE for both auctions (discussed further in Appendix C).
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Appendix
A Missing Details
A.1 Multi-Position VCG Auctions
Without loss of generality, we assume that bidders are arranged in descending order of bids and there are
no ties, i.e., b1 > b2 > · · · > bn. Since we run VCG auctions, bidder i gets the position i and the payment
extracted from the bidder i is exactly
∑m
j=i(pj − pj+1)bj . The utility that bidder i gets at being in position i
is exactly,
∑m
j=i(pj − pj+1) · (vi − bj). When there are ties, we break ties randomly.
B Missing Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Proof. We prove this lemma by considering the following cases,
• If b ≥ v + 1H , then mi,t = b implies ui,t((v, b−i,t); v) = 0, whereas, ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) = v − b ≤ − 1H with
probability at least 1/n, because of random tie-breaking. Therefore,
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
∣∣∣b ≥ v + 1
H
)
≥ P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
,mi,t = b
∣∣∣b ≥ v + 1
H
)
≥ P
(
ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≤ − 1
H
,mi,t = b
∣∣∣b ≥ v + 1
H
)
≥ 1
n
(
1
H
)n−1
≥ τ
n
where the second last inequality holds because P (mi,t = b) ≥
(
1
H
)n−1 and the last inequality is based
on the fact that 1Hn−1 ≥ τ .
• If b ≤ v− 1H , then mi,t = b implies ui,t((v, b−i,t); v) = v−mi,t ≥ 1H , whereas, ui,t(b, b−i,t); v)) = 0 with
both probability at least 1/n (random tie-breaking). Therefore,
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
∣∣∣b ≤ v − 1
H
)
≥ P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 1
H
,mi,t = b
∣∣∣b ≤ v − 1
H
)
≥ P
(
ui,t((b, b−i,t); v) = 0,mi,t = b
∣∣∣b ≤ v − 1
H
)
≥ 1
n
(
1
H
)n−1
≥ τ
n
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, we have E[ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)] ≥ τnH , for any fixed v, b 6= v and s ≤ t.
Then by Chernoff bound, we have
P
∑
s≤t
ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ τt
nH
− τt
2nH

≤ P
∑
s≤t
ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ tE[ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((v, b−i,s); v)]− τt
2nH

≤ exp
(
− 2τ
2t
4n2H2
)
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4
Proof. By definition of γt-mean-based learning algorithm, given a value v, each bid b 6= v will be selected
with probability at most γt for each bidder i, thus, bi,t+1 6= vi,t+1 holds with probability at most Hγt for any
bidder i. By union bound, mi,t+1 6= zi,t+1 holds with probability at most (n− 1)Hγt, for all i.
P
(
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ 1
H
)
≥ P
(
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ 1
H
,mi,t+1 = zi,t+1
)
≥ P
(
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ 1
H
,mi,t+1 = zi,t+1, zi,t+1 = b
)
≥ (1− (n− 1)Hγt) · τ
n
≥ τ
2n
,
where the third inequality is based on the same argument in Lemma 3.2 and the last inequality holds because
γt ≤ 12nH .
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B.4 Proof of Claim 3.6
Proof. Based on the construct of Tk and γt ≤ τ8nH ,∀t > T0, we have Tk ≥ 2Tk−1. Then |Γ`| = T` − T`−1 ≥
2`−1T0,∀` ≥ 1, we have
k(t)∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|τ
2
32n2H2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
+
∑
`=2
exp
(
−2
`−1τ2T0
32n2H2
)
≤ 2 exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
+
∑
`=1
exp
(
− 2
`τ2T0
32n2H2
)
= exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
·
(
2 +
∑
`=1
exp
(
− (2
` − 1)τ2T0
32n2H2
))
≤ exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
·
(
2 +
∑
`=1
exp
(
− `τ
2T0
32n2H2
))
(Because 2` − 1 ≥ `,∀` ≥ 1)
≤ exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
·
2 + 1
1− exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)

≤ 4 exp
(
− τ
2T0
32n2H2
)
,
where the last inequality holds, because exp
(
− τ2T032n2H2
)
≤ 12 if T0 is large enough.
B.5 Proof of Theorem 4.1
Here we slightly abuse the notation, let d v2e := {b ∈ V : b ≥ v2 , and b ≤ v2 + 1H }. Notice, if v2 ∈ V , d v2e = v2 .
If v2 /∈ V , d v2e = v2 + 12H . We prove this theorem based on the following claims,
Claim B.1. For any t ≤ T0, any fixed v, any bid b 6= d v2e, for each bidder i we have
Eb−i,t
[
ui,t((dv
2
e, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v)
]
≥ 1
2H2
Proof. Let UV denote the uniform distribution on V . Note, we assume the random tie-breaking in this paper,
then we can rewrite the expected utility of bidder i when t ≤ T0 in the following way
Eb−i,t∼UV [ui,t((b, b−i,t); v)] = (v − b) ·
((
b− 1
H
)
+
1
2
· 1
H
)
= (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
)
Then we consider two different cases in the following,
• v2 ∈ V , let b = v2 + α, where α ≥ 1H or α ≤ − 1H . Thus, we have(
v − v
2
)
·
(
v
2
− 1
2H
)
− (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
)
=
v2
4
− v
4H
−
(
v2
4
− α2 − v
4H
+
α
2H
)
= α2 − α
2H
≥ 1
2H2
14
• v2 /∈ V , then d v2e = v2 + 12H . Let b = d v2e+ α, where α ≥ 1H or α ≤ − 1H . Thus, we have(
v −
⌈v
2
⌉)
·
(⌈v
2
⌉
− 1
2H
)
− (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
)
=
(
v
2
− 1
2H
)
· v
2
−
(
v
2
− 1
2H
− α
)
·
(v
2
+ α
)
= α2 +
α
2H
≥ 1
2H2
Combining the above two cases, we complete the proof.
Claim B.2. For any fixed value v, any t ≤ T0, any bid b 6= d v2e, we have for each bidder i,
P
∑
s≤t
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)−
∑
s≤t
ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ τt
2nH
 ≤ exp(− t
8H4
)
Proof. By Claim B.1 and Chernoff bound, we have
P
∑
s≤t
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)−
∑
s≤t
ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ t
4H2

≤ P
∑
s≤t
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)−
∑
s≤t
ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤
∑
s≤t
Eb−i,s
[
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)
]
− t
4H2

≤ exp
(
− 2t
16H4
)
= exp
(
− t
8H4
)
Claim B.3. For any t > T0, for any fixed v, any bid b 6= d v2e and each bidder i, suppose
∑
s≤t ui,s((d v2e, b−i,s); v)−
ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ γtt holds, then for any fixed value v, any bid b 6= d v2e and each bidder i, we have,
Eb−i,t+1
[
ui,t+1((dv
2
e, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)
]
≥ 1
2H2
Proof. We assume for each bidder i, with probability ηit bids bi,i+1 = d vi,t+12 e and with probability 1 − ηit
bids bi,t+1 6= d vi,t+12 e. By the condition that
∑
s≤t ui,s((d v2e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ γtt and definition
of mean-based learning algorithm, we have ηit ≥ 1−Hγt for each bidder i.
Let bj,t+1, vj,t+1 be the bid and value from the other bidder j 6= i at time t+ 1, respectively. Then we can
show the lower bound of the expected utility for bidder i, when bid b ≤ 12 , in the following,
Eb−i,t+1 [ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)]
= (v − b) ·
(
P(b > bj,t+1) +
1
2
· P(bj,t+1 = b)
)
≥ ηjt · (v − b) ·
(
P(b > dvj,t+1
2
e) + 1
2
· P(dvj,t+1
2
e = b)
)
For any b ≤ 12 , 2b ∈ V . Then if vj,t+1 ≤ 2b− 2H , d vj,t+12 e < b. Therefore, P(b > d vj,t+12 e) = 2b− 2H . Notice,
when vj,t+1 = 2b− 2H or vj,t+1 = 2b− 1H , d vj,t+12 e = b, then P
(⌈ vj,t+1
2
⌉
= b
)
= 2H . Therefore, we can lower
bound the expected utility for bidder i, when bid b ≤ 12 ,
Eb−i,t+1 [ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)] ≥ 2ηjt · (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
)
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Similarly, we can upper bound the expected utility for bidder i, when bid b ≤ 12 , shown as below,
Eb−i,t+1 [ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)]
≤ ηjt · (v − b) ·
(
P(b > dvj,t+1
2
e) + 1
2
· P(dvj,t+1
2
e = b)
)
+ (1− ηjt )
= 2ηjt · (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
)
+ (1− ηjt )
Combining the above lower bound and upper bound of the expected utility of bidder i, we have for any
b ≤ 12 ,
Eb−i,t+1
[
ui,t+1((dv
2
e, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)
]
≥ 2ηjt ·
(
(v − dv
2
e) ·
(
dv
2
e − 1
2H
)
− (v − b) ·
(
b− 1
2H
))
− (1− ηjt )
≥ 2(1−Hγt) 1
2H2
−Hγt = (1−Hγt) 1
H2
−Hγt,
where the last inequality is based on the same argument as in Claim B.1. Finally, since T0 is large enough to
make γt ≤ 14H3 , then we have (1−Hγt) 1H2 −Hγt ≥ 34 · 1H2 − 14H2 = 12H2 . Thus, for any bid b ≤ 12 , we have,
Eb−i,t+1
[
ui,t+1((dv
2
e, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)
]
≥ 1
H
For bid b ≥ 12 + 1H , P(b > d vj,t+12 e) = 1 and P(d vj,t+12 e = b) = 0, then it is trivially to show for any v ∈ V ,
Eb−i,t+1
[
ui,t+1((
1
2
, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v)
]
≥ 1
H
Combining the case that b ≤ 12 , we complete the proof.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3.1, we divide the time steps t > T0 to several episodes as follows,
Γ1 = [T0 + 1, T1],Γ2 = [T1 + 1, T2], ..., such that ∀k ≥ 1, Tk =
⌊
( 1
4H2
+1)Tk−1
γTk+1
⌋
. We always choose the smallest
Tk to satisfy this condition. This Tk always exists since (γt + 1)t→∞ as t→∞. The total time steps of
each episode |Γk| = Tk − Tk−1,∀k ≥ 1. Then we show the following claim holds.
Claim B.4. Let event Ek be
∑
s≤Tk ui,s((d v2e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ Tk4H2 holds for all i, any fixed v,
and any bid b 6= d v2e. Then the event Ek holds with probability at least 1−
∑k
`=0 exp
(
− |Γ`|32H4
)
.
We prove the above claim by induction. If k = 0, the claim holds by Claim B.2. We assume the claim
holds for k, then we argue the claim still holds for k + 1. We consider any time t ∈ Γk+1, given event Ek
holds, we have∑
s≤t
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥
∑
s≤Tk
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)− (t− Tk)
≥ Tk
4H2
− Tk+1 + Tk =
(
1
4H2
+ 1
)
Tk − Tk+1 ≥ γtt,
(5)
where the first inequality holds because ui,s((d v2e, b−i,s); v) − ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ −1,∀s > Tk and the final
inequality holds because of the induction assumption and the last inequality hold because
γtt+ Tk+1 ≤ (γTk+1 + 1)Tk+1 = (γTk+1 + 1) ·
⌊(
1
4H2 + 1
)
Tk
γTk+1 + 1
⌋
≤
(
1
4H2
+ 1
)
Tk,∀t ∈ Γk+1.
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Then by Claim B.3, given Ek holds, for any t ∈ Γk+1 we have, E
[
ui,t((d v2e, b−i,t); v)− ui,t((b, b−i,t); v)
∣∣∣Ek] ≥
1
2H2 for any t ∈ Γk+1. By Azuma’s inequality (for martingale), we have
P
 ∑
s∈Γk+1
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤ |Γk+1|
4H2
∣∣∣Ek

≤ P
 ∑
s∈Γk+1
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≤
∑
s∈Γk+1
E
[
ui,s((dv
2
e, b−i,s); v)− ui,s((b, b−i,s); v)
∣∣∣Ek]− |Γk+1|
4H2
∣∣∣Ek

≤ exp
(
−|Γk+1|
32H4
)
Therefore, the event Ek+1 holds with probability at least(
1− exp
(
−|Γk+1|
32H4
))
· P(Ek) ≥ 1−
k+1∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|
32H4
)
,
which completes the induction. Given Claim 3.5, we have the following argument,
For any time t > T0, there exists k(t), s.t., t ∈ Γk(t), if the event Ek(t) happens, the bidder i will report
bt = d vi,t2 e at least 1−Hγt, by the definition of γt-mean-based learning algorithms and the same argument
as Eq. (5). Therefore, at any time t > T0, each bidder i will report truthfully with probability at least
1−Hγt −
k(t)∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|
32H4
)
= 1−Hγt −
k(t)∑
`=0
exp
(
− |Γ`|
32H4
)
We then bound k(t). First, Tk ≥
(
4H3+H
4H3+1
)
Tk−1, since γt ≤ 14H3 ,∀t > T0. Therefore, we have(
4H3+H
4H3+1
)(k(t)−1)
T0 ≤ t, which implies, k(t) + 1 ≤ 2 + log(t/T0)
log
(
4H3+H
4H3+1
) ≤ log t
log
(
4H3+H
4H3+1
) . In addition, we have
|Γ`| ≥ H−14H3+1T0. Combining the above arguments together, we complete the proof.
Remark. Let pi(t) be the probability that each bidder i bids d vi,t2 e at time t, for any fixed vi,t. As long as
T0 = Ω(log log t), pi(t)→ 1 as t→∞.
B.6 Proof of Theorem 4.3
This proof exactly follows the same technique in Theorem 3.1. Here we only mention the difference in
multi-position VCG auctions compared with second price auctions, summarized in the following two claims.
Claim B.5. For any fixed value v, and bid b 6= v and any time t ≤ T0, for each bidder i, we have
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t(b, b−i,t); v) ≥ ρ
H
)
≥ τ
n
Proof. Firstly, truthful bidding is the weakly dominant strategy for each bidder i, thus, for any b−i,t and
b 6= v, ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t(b, b−i,t); v) ≥ 0.
Then we focus on the case that b ≥ v + 1H here. It is analogous to show for the case b ≤ v − 1H and we
omit here. Consider the other bidders all bid b, since m < n, bidder i wins no slot if she bids truthfully, i.e.
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v) = 0 if bj,t = b,∀j 6= i. However, if bidder i bids b, by random tie-breaking, bidder i will win a
slot with probability 1/n and pay b if she wins, i.e., ui,t((b; b−i,t); v) ≤ ρ(v − b) ≤ − ρH if bidder i wins a slot.
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Notice, the probability that the other bidders all bid b is 1Hn−1 , therefore
P
(
ui,t((v, b−i,t); v)− ui,t(b, b−i,t); v) ≥ ρ
H
)
≥ 1
nHn−1
≥ τ
n
Claim B.6. For any t > T0, suppose
∑
s≤t ui,s((v, b−i,s); v) − ui,s((b, b−i,s); v) ≥ γtt holds for any fixed
v, b 6= v and each bidder i, then
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ ρ
H
holds with probability at least τ2n , for any fixed value v, bid b 6= v and each bidder i.
Proof. Similarly to Lemma 3.4, by definition of γt-mean-based learning algorithm and the condition assumed
in the claim, each bidder i will submit bid b = vi,t+1 at least 1−Hγt. Moreover, by Assumption 4.2, the
probability that the k-th largest value from the other bidders is b, is at least τ . Following the same argument
in Claim B.5, we have
ui,t+1((v, b−i,t+1); v)− ui,t+1((b, b−i,t+1); v) ≥ ρ
H
holds with probability at least (1−Hγt)n−1 τn ≥ (1−H(n− 1)γt) τn .
Given the above two claims, following the exactly same proof steps as in Theorem 3.1, we complete the
proof for Theorem 4.3.
C Additional Experiments
In this section, we outline the experimental setup for the contextual bandit experiments as well as the deep
Q-learning experiments. In the contextual bandit setting, we use the state to simply represent the private
value of the user and reward to be the utility of the auction. In the RL setup, we define the observations of
each agent as their private valuation, the state transitions as the next private valuation sampled randomly,
the rewards as the utility of the auction and the actions as the discrete bid chosen at each round. Note that
in the RL setup where the state is the private value and the next private valuation is sampled randomly, the
proposed setting would be similar to the contextual bandit setting. Our learning algorithm is the -greedy
which is a Mean-Based Algorithm studied earlier. In the experimental setup, we considered a finite horizon
episode consisting of N auction rounds (where N is chosen as 100 typically in the experiments).
C.1 Experiment Details
Contextual Bandits Setting: In first and second price auctions, we anneal the  for both players from 1.0
to 0.05 over 50,000 episodes with 100 rounds each. To measure the robustness of our results for more than
two players, we evaluate the equilibrium performance for three agents participating in a first price auction in
Figure 3.
Deep Q Learning Setting: In the DQN experiments mentioned earlier, we used Double Deep Q Networks
Van Hasselt et al. (2015) with Dueling Wang et al. (2016) and Prioritized Experience Replay Schaul et al.
(2015) to train the two agents with identical hyperparameters. In the experiments, the Q network is a
fully-connected network with hidden dimensions [256, 256] and tanh non-linearity, the number of discrete
states H = 100, the discount rate was set as γ = 0.99 and the learning rate α = 0.0005. We train over 400,000
time steps with target network updates frequency of τ = 500 steps. The size of the replay memory buffer
is 50000 and the minibatch size is 32 (such that 1000 time steps are sampled from the buffer at each train
iteration). We use an  greedy policy with annealing wherein  decreases linearly from 1 to 0.02 in 200,000
steps.
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Figure 3: Training curve of mean reward of each bidder (left) and roll-out bidding strategy of each bidder
(right) in the exploitation phase of contextual ε-Greedy algorithm in first price auctions for three bidders.
Figure 4: The roll-out of the optimal bidding strategy of each bidder with deep state representations in
second price auction (left) and first price auction (right).
To capture the inter-dependence of actions chosen by the bidder, we model the observation for each agent
as the current private valuation, the previous valuation, the previous bid and the auction outcome. Like
before, we observe that the agents bid approximately with truthful bids for second price auctions and BNE
for first price auctions in Figures 4.
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